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In 2005, the Government of Sudan1 and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) concluded 
the landmark Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 
formally ending the civil war that had been raging since 
1983. The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was 
subsequently formed in the southern region of the 
country and the Government of National Unity was 
formed in Khartoum, the national capital. As agreed in 
the CPA, in January 2011, Southern Sudanese voted in a 
referendum on the independence of their region, which 
was overwhelmingly supported, and six months later 
Southern Sudan seceded. Less than three years later, 
however, the newest state in the world relapsed yet again 
into war, triggering a humanitarian crisis that the South 
Sudanese and the international community continue to 
grapple with. 
Between 2005 and the outbreak of fighting in December 
2013, donors provided billions of dollars for recovery, 
humanitarian aid, development and for building new 
state institutions for first GoSS and then the new South 
Sudanese state (Maxwell et al. 2016). In 2012 and 
2013, for example, official development assistance 
was between USD 1.5 and USD 2 billion (ibid). The 
prevalent approach of statebuilding focused mainly on 
infrastructure and bureaucracy. Engagement was based 
on the underlying assumption that service delivery 
fosters state legitimacy, a popular theory in the ‘New 
Deal’ era of statebuilding (see Zaum 2015). Emerging 
literature, however, indicates that there is no strong direct 
correlation between service delivery and government 
or state legitimacy (see Mcloughlin 2015). This is partly 
because, as Mcloughlin argues, the notion that service 
delivery enhances state legitimacy is apolitical and fails 
to grasp the fact that legitimation and de-legitimation 
are about political structures, ideas and agency. This 
concept also neglects the historical dimensions of state 
structures and history of divisions within the society and 
the political sphere in South Sudan. 
Using South Sudan as its case, then, this report further 
interrogates people’s perceptions of the state, focusing 
on sources of legitimacy that are not primarily related 
to service delivery.2 It covers the period from the onset 
of civil war in 1983 to the present time. We contend 
that the war period (1983-2005) was a formative one 
for the government or state structures and practices 
that emerged after this period, especially following the 
1 This refers to the Sudan before the secession of Southern Sudan on 9 July 
2011.
2 A comprehensive analysis of the nexus of basic service delivery and 
legitimacy in Southern/South Sudan is presented in Maxwell et al. (2016).
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birth of the South Sudanese state in 2011. We therefore 
underline the importance of historical antecedents of 
policies and practices of the GoSS during the Interim 
Period (2005-2011) and subsequently of the South 
Sudanese state. Accordingly, the report addresses the 
following key questions: 
 ■ What ideas, ideologies and actions did leaders of 
the SPLM/A employ during the war to challenge the 
legitimacy of the Sudanese state and also to mobilise 
public support for their cause? 
 ■ How did these ideas, ideologies and actions influence 
the legitimacy of government and state structures 
after the war ended in 2005? 
 ■ What are the key sources of legitimacy of the South 
Sudanese state? 
In this report, we understand state legitimacy as ‘popular 
approval of the state’s “rules of the game”, or the system 
of rules and expectations on which government actions 
are based’ (Mcloughlin 2015: 1). By so doing we are 
not attempting to measure or evidence legitimacy but 
to explore the different dimensions of legitimacy in 
relation to South Sudan. We consider different concepts 
of legitimacy that ‘coexist and intersect’ (Lentz 1998: 
59) and potentially also compete. For instance, the 
state is often associated with individuals and not with 
government or state institutions; public authority is also 
wielded and claimed by non-state actors; and the line 
between state and society is blurred (Lund 2006: 1). We 
therefore explore not only legitimacy of the state but also 
a broader concept of legitimacy. This is further developed 
in later sections of the report. 
SLRC research and publications on South Sudan 
illustrate that how citizens view government or state 
structures in South Sudan is not only shaped by the 
access to basic services (Maxwell et al. 2015). What is 
important to respondents is to have access to services 
irrespectively of the provider. Other factors play a key 
role in influencing citizens’ view of the state in South 
Sudan. These include the provision of security before and 
after the signing of the CPA as well as the role of SPLM/A 
leaders during the armed rebellion against the regimes 
based in Khartoum ending in the independence of the 
country. Without doubt, provision of basic services and 
security is crucial for South Sudanese because the region 
has been devastated by years of civil war, and insecurity 
remained a significant problem even after peace was 
3 By this we mean Sudan before the secession of the Southern region on 9 July 2011.
4 The concept of ‘Little Men’ and ‘Big Men’ has been employed by Jean-Francois Bayart (2009) to illustrate the inequality manufactured by the state in Africa through 
notion of development that breeds inequality.
formally attained in 2005. Jonglei State – a focus area of 
SLRC – had been affected by inter-communal violence, 
cattle raiding and insurgencies before December 2013 
(Maxwell et al. 2014; Gordon 2014). Since December 
2013, insecurity has even become more problematic 
in South Sudan as many areas have been engulfed in 
fighting between government and rebel forces. But also 
the long armed rebellion against the Khartoum-based 
regimes is important for most South Sudanese when 
legitimacy questions are raised. At least before the recent 
resurgence of major armed conflict, many leaders of the 
SPLM/A were often viewed as liberators from Khartoum’s 
misrule. Therefore, the contribution of this paper is to 
highlight the role of the leaders of the armed struggle in 
shaping people’s view of the state in South Sudan. 
There is a long history of oppression and exploitation of 
Southern Sudanese by Khartoum-based regimes. Like 
many postcolonial regimes in Africa, most of the former 
Sudanese3 regimes were led by military ‘big men.’4 
Notably, before the signing of the CPA, there were only 
three short multiparty periods: from 1953 to 1958, 1964 
to 1969, and 1986 to 1989 (Willis et al. 2009). The last 
of the military ‘big men’ of Sudan is President Omer el 
Bashir, who has been in power since 1989. 
Like other ‘big men’ elsewhere, el Bashir has been 
perceived as an illegitimate leader by many people both 
in and outside of the country. Although he regularly 
engages in elections, the results are questionable: the 
most recent election gave him 94 percent of the total 
votes cast. The citizens of the present Sudan are bracing 
themselves for ‘more of the same,’ including no respite 
from armed rebellions in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and 
Blue Nile (Suliman 2015). 
One of the clear manifestations of the illegitimacy of 
military ‘big men’ is unending armed rebellions against 
their rule. The first civil war in the former Sudan began 
before the attainment of independence in 1956 and 
ended in March 1972, although any organised form 
of rebellion in the south only really started in 1963 
(Rolandsen 2011). After a ten-year interlude of peace, 
civil war resumed in 1983, this time waged against 
Khartoum by the SPLM/A. When the civil war ended in 
2005, the new GoSS was dominated by the former rebel 
leaders of the SPLM/A. Southern Sudan had wide-ranging 
powers. Some people thought it had a quasi-confederal 
status (see Khalid 2010: 232), while others claimed it 
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was a de facto state (Deng 2013). It formally became 
independent in 2011 but continued to be dogged by 
rebellions, the worst of which began in 2013. 
This paper is based on writings on Southern/South Sudan 
developments from the onset of the second civil war 
in 1983 to the present time and draws on literature on 
statebuilding and legitimacy as well as our experiences 
and information acquired mainly during research trips 
in South Sudan under the Secure Livelihoods Research 
Consortium (SLRC). Over the course of four years, we 
conducted interviews with: members of the Nuer ethnic 
group in northern Jonglei in early 2013; Murle internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) in Juba in late 2013; Dinka 
IDPs in Lakes State and Nuer IDPs in Ganyiel in Unity 
State in 2014; and Dinka IDPs and members of the 
host community in Eastern Equatoria State in 2015. 
5  Details on interviews and other methods used in generating information during field trips in South Sudan are available from SLRC website
Moreover, information was collected during interviews 
and other engagements with political leaders and civil 
servants; local and international aid workers, donors, 
and diplomats; academics; members of civil society 
organisations (CSOs) and others in Juba.5
The next section explores the literature on legitimacy, 
focusing on its sources in conflict and post-conflict 
settings. Section 3 covers the armed rebellion from 
1983 to 2005, analysing the ideas and ideologies 
that the SPLM/A leaders adopted to mobilise support 
and examining processes and motivations for the 
development of governance structures and perceptions 
of these processes and practices. Section 4 traces 
continuities in governance practices into the post-CPA 
period and also examines sources of legitimacy from that 
time. The last section concludes.
Women in a market in Lakes state. Credit: UNDP South Sudan / Brian Sokol
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Current statebuilding discourses and practices are 
influenced by academic and policy debates on ‘failed,’ 
‘weak’ and fragile states that developed in the 1990s in 
response to civil wars in Africa and other continents and 
in response to other crises affecting states, especially 
terrorism (Migdal and Schlichte 2005; Raeymaekers 
2005). After the events of 9/11, ‘failed’ and fragile 
states increasingly came to be seen as a menace to 
the international system of states (Raeymaekers 2005). 
Fragile states are associated with limited control over 
territory, weak institutions, limited legitimacy, limited 
capacity to deliver services, and weak leadership 
(Rocha Menocal 2011). They are therefore perceived 
as ‘vulnerable to overthrow or collapse’ (Gilley 2006a), 
leading to more violence and humanitarian crises, mass 
displacement, terrorism and other negative outcomes. 
In response to that perceived threat, international 
engagement of bilateral donors, multilateral agencies 
and international NGOs since the 1990s has focused on 
statebuilding (Goetschel and Hagmann 2009; Migdal and 
Schlichte 2005). In particular, ‘rebuilding the deficient 
bureaucratic apparatuses of sub-Saharan African 
governments then [became] a major preoccupation and 
challenge for international donors’ (Hagmann and Péclard 
2010). Statebuilding in this context means ‘actions 
undertaken by national and/or international actors to 
establish, reform, and strengthen state institutions where 
these have been seriously eroded or are missing’ (Rocha 
Menocal 2011: 1719). The underlying expectation is 
that the state will be able to deliver services to its people 
and hence improve people’s perceptions about the state 
(Clements 2014). 
The link between statebuilding and legitimacy has, 
however, been increasingly questioned. Perceptions and 
conceptions of the state and legitimacy vary between 
individuals and change over time. Values, norms, emic 
concepts, past experiences, expectations and political 
contexts shape views about legitimacy – that is, whether 
institutions, regulations, laws, individuals including 
politicians and bureaucrats or practices and processes 
are seen as legitimate (Mcloughlin 2015: 1; Gilley 2006b; 
Roberts 2008). As Lund stressed: ‘what is legitimate 
varies between and within cultures and over time, and 
is continuously (re-)established through conflict and 
negotiation. Somewhat polemically, one could argue 
that legitimacy’s most constant feature is people’s 
preoccupation with it’ (Lund 2006: 693). Notions of 
legitimacy, authority and statehood that are grounded 
2 Literature on 
statebuilding 
and sources of 
legitimacy
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only in Western (and particularly Weberian) concepts of 
the state, cannot adequately characterise the complexity 
of ideas of legitimacy in Southern/South Sudan. 
In many countries, the state is understood as ‘the basic 
institutional and ideological structure of a political 
community’ (Gilley 2006b) while the government 
constitutes ‘the particular occupants of executive office 
at any given time’ (ibid). In politically fragile countries 
such as South Sudan, however, the lines between 
government and state are blurred. States are ‘an effect 
of everyday practices, representational discourses, 
and multiple modalities of power’ (Sharma and Gupta 
2006: 165) and ‘historical processes that include and 
span the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods’ 
(Hagmann and Péclard 2010: 542). Neither can state and 
society be easily distinguished (Lund 2006). While it is 
important to distinguish between state and government 
at an analytical level, most people in South Sudan use 
the Arabic term hakuma for both the state and the 
government interchangeably. 
Political and state legitimacy is made, contested, claimed 
and negotiated in public discourse by a variety of actors. 
These include citizens, with their various views of political 
legitimacy, and individuals and groups that make claims 
of legitimacy. Legitimacy is ‘engineered through political 
processes – such as when elites draw on people’s 
norms and ideas to persuade them that the rules of 
power are justifiable’ (Mcloughlin 2015: 2). Depending 
on context and interests, leaders, politicians, officials, 
administrators, chiefs, rebels and other individuals and 
groups who claim to represent the state or who claim 
public authority refer to different repertoires and different 
sources of legitimacy (Hagmann and Péclard 2010). 
According to Bierschecnk (1993: 241):
Their strategies in the struggle for public authority, power 
and material wealth have been described as ‘straddling’, 
i.e. the conscious linking of political, economic and other 
resources, the combination of traditional and modern 
sources of political legitimacy, the fusion of public and 
private spheres and the social roles they engender.
These sources of legitimacy may include reference 
to and different interpretations of tradition. These 
interpretations of tradition constitute a ‘repertoire’ of 
political action and emerge as the common reference 
to traditional authority, institutions, rules, symbols 
and practices (Clements 2014; Rocha Menocal 2011). 
Political leaders in South Sudan often utilise symbols 
of authority, such as walking sticks, or refer to their 
family background as belonging to a chiefly family or 
the family of a traditional leader, which can be a source 
of authority and legitimacy (Santschi 2016). Identity, 
competence in traditional fields of engagement such as 
conflict resolution, local justice, and mediation, as well 
as the provision of security and skills in warfare are also 
identified as traditional bases for claiming legitimacy 
(Gledhill 1994). 
Personal qualities and charisma may also be a source of 
legitimacy. This is common in some areas of South Sudan 
where the legitimacy of leaders, for example chiefs, is 
grounded in personal qualities and to a lesser degree 
in ‘official functions’ (Bierschenck and de Sardan 1997: 
453). 
Other forms of legitimacy are performance and 
procedural legitimacy (Rocha Menocal 2011: 1724). 
Performance legitimacy refers to the ‘(effective) provision 
of public goods and services (eg the modern welfare 
state), or sustained economic growth,’ among other 
aspects (ibid). These public goods also include security 
and rule of law (Carter 2011: 9). Fragile and conflict-
affected states are often able to provide public goods, 
only to a limited degree. Procedural legitimacy is ‘more 
process-oriented, depending less on outcomes than on 
agreed-upon formal rules and procedures for decision-
making and political participation’ (Rocha Menocal 2011: 
1724). 
Elections can be a source of procedural legitimacy. 
African leaders have long been instrumentalising 
elections and multi-partyism – practices associated with 
democracy – in order to claim and increase their internal 
and international legitimacy or/and for self-preservation 
(Gledhill 1994; Bayart and Ellis 2000). Bayart and Ellis 
noted that the ‘transition to multi-partyism was not 
more than a fig leaf from the prudish view of the West 
the enhanced exercise of the politique du ventre by 
authoritarian regimes’ (2000: 225). 
State practices and symbols are also applied by non-state 
actors such as rebel groups that act officially to enhance 
their authority and legitimacy (Sharma and Gupta 
2006). Rebel groups that claim to govern and hold public 
authority often establish administrations or institutions 
and attempt and claim to provide security, basic services, 
legislatures and justice in the territory which they control 
(Mampilly 2011). During the civil war period (1983-
2005), the SPLM/A followed this strategy by establishing 
government institutions and passing acts of ‘the New 
Sudan.’ 
Statebuilding and legitimacy
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Legitimacy can also be conferred by external actors. By 
following or pretending to follow the policies of external 
actors focused on good governance and statebuilding, 
African leaders try to secure international support 
and legitimacy. Bayart suggested that African elites 
tend to capture discourses on democracy and good 
governance without actually following them. Such notions 
and discourses constitute a ‘new type of economic 
rent’ (Bayart 2009: xiii) whereby African elites attract 
international funds and other forms of support (Bayart 
and Ellis 2000). Cooperation with donors, humanitarian 
agencies and international NGOs within the framework 
of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) – as discussed in other 
parts of this report – was an important source of external 
recognition and internal legitimacy for the SPLM/A. 
This external support and conferral of recognition and 
legitimacy continued even after the signing of the CPA 
in 2005 with massive donor-funded statebuilding and 
peacebuilding projects. 
Different levels of government and state institutions are 
perceived and seen differently by citizens. In the case of 
South Sudan, national government structures formerly 
in Khartoum and now in Juba are often seen by those 
outside the capital or otherwise without access to them 
as distant and alien: ‘…an animal called government. 
And nobody knows this animal’ (Santschi 2016: 313). 
By contrast, local government institutions, including 
the chiefs, are seen as close and reachable, and their 
underlying norms and practices predictable. ‘They are 
closely connected to the government, and yet somehow 
apart from it too,’ say Leonardi. et al (2010). Their 
legitimacy is not straightforward, but nevertheless ‘the 
chiefs are distinguished from the even less-trusted 
government and police’ (ibid). In contrast to other 
higher-level officials and administrators, chiefs can be 
challenged and held accountable for unpopular decisions 
and practices (Santschi 2016).
Statebuilding endeavours championed by donors 
have come under criticism for a number of reasons, 
including for being grounded in an ahistorical and linear 
understanding of states and state development in Africa, 
and for promoting a decontextualised ‘ideal of Western 
liberal democracy’ (Hagmann and Péclard 2010: 541). 
Statebuilding is criticised for being based on technical 
tools and an externally driven, top-down approach 
that does not take into account the highly political and 
contextual dimensions of statebuilding and peacebuilding 
activities (Clements 2014; Goetschel and Hagmann 
2009). Further, donor engagements that aim to foster 
statebuilding and the legitimacy of the state ‘have tended 
to over-privilege a focus on building and strengthening 
formal state institutions’ (Rocha Menocal 2011: 1726) 
and process and performance legitimacy. In doing 
this, informal institutions that are often important to 
governance have been neglected. Given that legitimacy is 
strongly influenced by experiences, norms and values, the 
neglect of informal legitimacy and authority is questioned 
by some (Clements 2014). 
Gradually, debates on statebuilding have begun to take on 
a more nuanced approach. For example, the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
pointed out in a 2011 report that: ‘statebuilding is 
a deeply political process, and understanding the 
context – especially what is perceived as legitimate in a 
specific context – is crucial if international support is to 
be useful’ (OECD DAC 2012: 11). Despite the changing 
debate, however, statebuilding in practice continues to be 
informed by models of liberal democracy and neoliberal 
economic practices, and is still dominated by technical 
approaches and externally driven (Roberts 2008). In the 
case of South Sudan, critics have observed that, starting 
from 2005, donors and other international actors have 
largely focused their efforts on technical activities. Their 
engagement has been largely ahistorical and apolitical, 
and hence has neglected the political tensions among key 
players in South Sudan that boiled over into war in 2013 
(Pantuliano 2014).
Protest, Juba. Credit: Gregg Carlstrom
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3 Second War and 
legitimacy
As noted, the legitimacy of the recently born South 
Sudanese state is partly shaped by the long history of 
armed struggle against the (former) Sudanese state. 
Since the colonial days, most South Sudanese have 
viewed ‘the state’ as exploitative and repressive. Many 
South Sudanese will point out that the worst kind of 
exploitation was slavery, perpetrated before and during 
colonial times and later in the midst of the 1983-2005 
Sudanese civil war, mainly by people from groups from 
the north of the country who came to dominate the state 
after the independence of Sudan from the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium in 1956 (Jok 2001). Indeed, southern 
Sudanese politicians accepted independence only after 
northern politicians agreed to give ‘full consideration’ 
to federation in the preparation of the postcolonial 
constitution. This promise was dishonoured after 
independence was achieved, however. Subsequently, the 
perceived exploitation, repression and marginalisation 
of southerners by the Sudanese state continued, as 
the leaders of the country tried to impose Islam and 
Arabism throughout the country as a way of creating a 
unified nation (Johnson 2003). Hence, most southern 
Sudanese viewed the postcolonial state as a new form 
of colonialism that excluded them and did not represent 
their interests. Indeed, Dunstan Wai succinctly argued 
that, ‘Southern Sudan had no concept of a Southern 
Sudan united with the Northern Arab Sudan’ (Wai 1980: 
394). For southerners, the Sudanese state was not only 
illegitimate but also coercive, and hence they took up 
arms against it.
The first civil war began in 1955, some months before 
the attainment of Sudanese independence the following 
year, and ceased in 1972 with the signing of the Addis 
Ababa Peace Agreement between the regime of General 
Jaafar Mohamed Nimeiri (1969-1985) and the Southern 
Sudan Liberation Movement, also known as the ‘Anyanya’ 
movement. A largely autonomous regional government, 
managed by southern Sudanese, was set up in southern 
Sudan. Attempts by successive northern-dominated 
governments to impose Islam as well as the Arabic 
language and Arabic culture on the south temporarily 
ceased, and English was made the working language 
in government offices. Also, southern Sudanese chose 
their leaders through relatively free and fair elections and 
were promised a more equitable share of the country’s 
resources. In general, the agreement addressed some 
of the key grievances that had fuelled the civil war. It 
therefore conferred some legitimacy on the Sudanese 
state, and increased the popularity of Jaafar Nimeiri, who 
became a ‘uniquely popular Northerner in the South, 
enjoying a reputation as the region’s savior from civil war’ 
Statebuilding and legitimacy
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(Woodward 1996: 4). 
However, Jaafar Nimeiri abrogated the agreement in 
1982, divided the southern region into three regions 
in June 1983, and imposed Islamic law, or shari’a, over 
the whole country in September of the same year. Thus, 
the Addis Ababa Agreement, at one point arguably 
his greatest achievement, ended as just another 
dishonoured deal (Alier 1990). As a result, southerners 
reverted to their old hostility towards a state that had 
become illegitimate and coercive once more. According 
to Bona Malwal, the abrogation of the Addis Ababa Peace 
Agreement ‘triggered the real war for South Sudan’s 
independence and facilitated its eventual independence 
in 2011’ (Malwal 2014: 51).
The second round of armed rebellion started in 1983. It 
was led by the SPLM/A, which championed the struggle 
against the regimes of the so-called ‘Old Sudan’ that 
were led by military ‘strong men’ whose leadership was 
invariably perceived as illegitimate by many southern 
Sudanese (Macklin 20004). Contrary to the first 
rebellion, however, the SPLM/A leadership under John 
Garang aimed to maintain the unity of the country but 
under a different political and economic dispensation. 
The SPLM/A manifesto, issued in 1983, categorically 
rejected independence, and insisted that the south was 
‘an integral and inseparable part of the Sudan’ (SPLM/A 
1983: 16). It employed the slogan of a united ‘New 
Sudan’ to mobilise support from the Ethiopian leader, 
Mengistu Haile Mariam, and the Eastern Block. At that 
time Mengistu was battling secessionist Eritrean rebels, 
and therefore would not support any groups struggling 
for independence. However, the majority of Southerners 
favoured the independence of Southern Sudan (Malwal 
2003). After the end of the Cold War and the collapse 
of the Mengistu regime, the SPLM/A got embroiled in a 
major internal power struggle, which nearly led to the 
end of the insurgency. The power struggle was partly 
over the direction of the movement: whether it should be 
struggle for John Garang’s ‘New Sudan’ or embrace self-
determination, leading to independence.
This next section discusses the notion of ‘New Sudan’ 
and the adoption of self-determination at the 1994 
Chukudum Convention, and ends with a summary of 
sources of legitimacy of the SPLM/A, which also had to 
do with the popularity of SPLM leaders, especially John 
Garang. The notion of ‘New Sudan’, and the contests for 
power that surrounded it, partly shaped the institutions 
that emerged after the war ended in 2005 as well as the 
expectations of the southern Sudanese people. 
3.1. ‘New Sudan’ ideology
John Garang espoused the notion of a ‘New Sudan’, which 
he claimed was quite different from the ‘Old Sudan,’ a 
system considered oppressive and exploitative and 
hence lacking in legitimacy. Speaking on the second 
anniversary of the founding of the SPLM/A in 1984, he 
claimed that leaders of the ‘Old Sudan’ were brought 
together ‘by ties of opportunism, of “trim trim” or of 
whisky- and beer-drinking parties’ (Wel 2013: 89). The 
SPLM/A, he continued, was the only rebellion in the 
history of the country to have started in the south and 
provided
a new force capable of galvanizing all revolutionary, 
progressive, democratic and patriotic forces into a united 
political alternative capable of tackling and correcting the 
fundamental problems such as the ‘National Question’, 
destruction of the present exploitative and repressive 
socio-economic and socio-political structure in our 
country and the building of new structures consistent 
with particularity of the New Sudan so that we shall never 
again be hungry in the midst of vast agricultural and 
mineral riches. (Wel 2013)
The SPLM (1998) proclaimed that with its vision of the 
‘New Sudan’ that its aim was:
a new Sudanese commonality that seeks to include 
rather than exclude; a new Sudanese political 
dispensation that provides equal opportunities for every 
Sudanese to develop and realise his or her potential; a 
Sudan where there is justice and equality of opportunity 
for all; a democratic Sudan in which governance is 
based on popular will and the rule of law; a New Sudan 
where religion and state are constitutionally separated; 
a New Sudan in which oppression and hegemony by any 
particular ethnic group are banished; a Sudan in which 
all the institutions of social, cultural and racial hegemony 
are dismantled; a Sudan in which there is respect for 
universal human rights.
John Garang was advocating a revolution that would 
bring about a new system that represented the interests 
of all Sudanese peoples, hence one that would not be 
lacking in legitimacy. In his book, The Power of Creative 
Reasoning: The Ideas and Vision of John Garang, his 
kinsman and confidant Lual Deng argues that John 
Garang, in contrast to other leaders of the country, 
had the competence and vision to correctly diagnose 
the malaise of the country and propose effective 
prescriptions that could cure it forever (Deng 2013a: 80).
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John Garang promoted socialism as the antidote to the 
country’s economic problems. According to the SPLM 
Manifesto, the rebellion would ‘spearhead socialist 
transformation of the Sudan, beginning in the Southern 
Sudan’ (SPLM/A 1983: 27). He further argued that the 
economic backwardness of Sudan was a result of colonial 
policies and practices, which were compounded by the 
actions of neo-colonialist regimes of the postcolonial era. 
Having lived in Tanzania during the time of Julius Nyerere, 
who championed African socialism and at a time when 
Pan Africanism was popular among the African diaspora, 
his ideas were most likely influenced by African socialism 
and Pan Africanism. Significantly, in Tanzania, he came 
under the mentorship of Professor Walter Rodney, the 
author of How Europe Underdeveloped Africa and a 
powerful advocate of Pan Africanism (Wel 2013). These 
ideas were also promoted by anti-colonial African leaders, 
particularly Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Patrice 
Lumumba of Congo. 
John Garang’s diagnosis of Sudan’s problems was actually 
not novel, but his proposed solution was. Many Sudanese, 
especially those who believed in communism or socialism, 
had argued earlier than John Garang that the main 
problem that faced the country was uneven development, 
and specifically the inequality in basic service provision, 
entrenched by the actions of the bourgeoisie or elites who 
dominated political power in the centre (Khalid 2009). 
Before embarking on the revolution, however, John 
Garang had to deal with the secessionist fervour in 
the South. The notion of the ‘New Sudan’, an aim to 
legitimate the rebellion, did not garner southern-wide 
support (Washburne 2010); it actually went against 
the rudimentary southern nationalism that had been 
evolving over the years. The unity of the disparate 
southern Sudanese groups was engendered by collective 
opposition to the north, especially the dominant northern 
Muslim and ‘Arab’ political elite. The glue that bound 
the multiple southern ethnicities was ‘their struggle 
for freedom and collective action against the north’ 
(Jok 2011: 2). Hence, John Garang’s revolution was a 
departure from what the majority of southern Sudanese 
believed in but won him support and admiration from 
long-marginalised groups in the north, for whom 
the dream of independence was nearly impossible. 
Nonetheless, this support did not translate to a 
substantial number of northern fighters committed to the 
SPLM/A cause, at least not in the beginning. Islam was 
a potent force used by regimes in Khartoum to dissuade 
northern Sudanese groups, especially in the west of 
the country, from joining those they labelled as infidels 
or kuffar in the south. Many of the soldiers who fought 
for regimes in Khartoum were recruited from among 
marginalised groups in Darfur and Kordofan. 
John Garang used his rhetorical prowess to try to win 
over the southern populace to the ‘New Sudan’ idea. 
Alongside propaganda, John Garang’s SPLM/A employed 
heavy-handed tactics against civilians in areas under 
its control, compelling some to flee into garrison towns, 
where a number of them were forcibly recruited into 
militias deployed against the SPLA (Nyaba 1997: 53). 
Some civilians headed for refugee camps in neighbouring 
countries. Thus, ‘in the absence of an ideology 
meaningful for the southern Sudanese, the party/army 
relied on violence against civilians’ (Young 2012: 63).
Garang and his close aides monopolised decision-making 
in the rebellion despite the fact that some institutions 
had already been established. A Political-Military High 
Command was appointed to be the central organising 
body of the SPLM/A in 1986, but a meeting of its 
members was never called until 1991, and actually took 
place after the attempt to oust Garang (Douglas 2003: 
91; Rolandsen 2005). After 1986, a rudimentary ‘Civil/
Military Administration’ was also formed (Bure 2005). In 
this, the SPLM/A depended on chiefs whose authority 
dated back to the period of the Anglo-Egyptian colonial 
rule, and thus it ‘relied mainly on the old “indirect” rule 
system for governing the civilian population, and 
on a small number of civil/military administrators 
who functioned as the link between local SPLM/A 
commanders and chiefs’ (Rolandsen 2005: 29). The 
Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), the 
humanitarian wing of the SPLM/A, was also established 
during this period (Chol 1996). 
Garang used force against the armed southern Sudanese 
who rejected his ideas and contested his leadership. The 
support of the Ethiopian government, under Mengistu, 
enabled Garang to defeat southern secessionists, who 
had by then organised as the ‘Anyanya 2’ rebel group. 
They were originally Anyanya fighters who rejected the 
Addis Ababa and were later joined by other mutineers 
between 1975 and 1983. As the Addis Peace Agreement 
collapsed, more and more fighters joined their ranks. 
Anyanya 2 leaders who did not succeed in the leadership 
struggle against Garang and who rejected the idea of 
a united Sudan withdrew from the SPLM/A (Johnson 
2003). Many of the survivors of the SPLM/A onslaught on 
Anyanya 2 were reabsorbed into the SPLA, their interest 
in separatism driven underground and anger repressed. 
As Rolandsen has pointed out, wounds inflicted on 
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Anyanya 2, mainly on Nuer fighters, were never healed, 
which led to another round of fighting among southerners 
in 1991 (Rolandsen 2005: 36). Even most of the loyal 
Dinka followers of Garang harboured a hidden separatist 
motive, contrary to his vision of the unified ‘New Sudan’. 
According to Francis Deng, also a Dinka, the popular 
saying attributed to Dinka soldiers – ‘Ke thartu, angicku’ 
or ‘What we are fighting for, we know’ – encapsulated 
the Dinka, and indeed wider southern, attitude toward 
the armed struggle; it meant southerners were actually 
fighting for a separate state, and not the idea of a united 
‘New Sudan’ (Deng 2007: 93). 
As is common in many conflicts, people were fighting for 
a host of reasons. Some people joined up because of 
local grievances, such as the predatory activities of the 
Reziegat and Misseriya militias in Bahr el Ghazal. Such 
local conflicts compelled thousands of Dinka young men 
to enlist and head to Ethiopia to collect guns to defend 
their communities with; they ended up disappointed when 
the SPLM/A deployed them elsewhere (Mathok 2009: 
xxv). Returning SPLA troops protected communities in 
Bahr el-Ghazal, for instance, from attacks by northern 
militias. SPLA troops also stopped inter-communal 
violence through draconic punishments (Santschi 2016). 
Thus in some contexts, the SPLM/A provided security 
and in others was perceived as a source of insecurity, 
particularly in Equatoria (Bradbury 2006; Mampilly 2011; 
Jok 2015). The provision of security is understood as a 
key source of legitimacy for rebel groups (Mampilly 2011).
A lot of blood was spilled in the struggle between the 
SPLM/A and Anyanya 2. To counter Jaafar Nimeiri’s 
propaganda, and also to win support among marginalised 
northern Sudanese, Garang declared that ‘the concrete 
proof of our belief in commitment to the Sudanese unity 
lies in the blood shed with these separatists and bandits 
in order to preserve the unity of the Sudan’ (Mampilly 
2011: 65). The blood of the fallen southerners was the 
cement for Sudanese unity, he added. People from 
different nationalities and regions in the country were 
‘cemented together by ties of struggle, ties of sweat, ties 
of blood and ties of common concerns and tears,’ he 
concluded (68). The shedding of blood of southerners 
did not enhance the legitimacy of the SPLM/A among 
southern Sudanese but facilitated Garang’s total control 
over the rebellion by eliminating or side-lining challengers 
to his leadership. Indeed, some of Garang’s critics 
have argued that the bloodletting was principally over 
leadership (Akol 2009).
Another repercussion, perhaps less recognised, of the 
repression of separatists was the deepening of ethnic 
antagonisms, especially between the Dinka and the Nuer. 
The Dinka Bor dominated the SPLA (Rolandsen 2005). 
John Young argues that John Garang actually ‘built the 
core of the SPLM/A around his Bor Dinka community’ 
(Young 2012). Many of the Anyanya 2 fighters were Nuer, 
and probably saw Garang’s targeting of their group as 
ethnically motivated. These divisions quickly led to inter-
ethnic bloodshed. In May 1984, for example, the Anyanya 
2 under William Abdallah Choul reportedly murdered 
about 3,000 SPLA recruits in Fangak while transiting to 
Ethiopia, leaving many Dinka families in Bahr el Ghazal 
grieving and probably planning eventual revenge (Johnson 
2003: 198). Further ethnically based massacres involving 
Dinka and Nuer as perpetrators or victims took place, 
though we distinguish between these and the framing of 
South Sudan’s wars – particularly the current one – as 
‘ethnic conflict,’ as some analyses have done. The ethnic 
biases that have come to the fore during these conflicts 
are the result of the histories of political discrimination 
and marginalisation along ethnic lines, as outlined here, 
and are not absolute, as demonstrated by the alliance 
of Bul Nuer in Unity State with the GoSS in the current 
conflict. 
3.2 The 1991 split and 1994 Chukudum 
convention
Garang’s ‘New Sudan’ idea and leadership faced a major 
challenge after the Cold War ended, and the subsequent 
overthrow of the Mengistu regime in May 1991. In 
August, three prominent SPLM/A commanders – Riek 
Machar, Lam Akol and Gordon Kong – tried to oust him, 
in part because they wanted southerners to fight for 
independence from the north and not for a united ‘New 
Sudan’. They also disapproved of Garang’s leadership 
style, which they claimed was dictatorial and heavy-
handed (Akol 2003). 
This internal power struggle resulted in a split, with armed 
factions turning their guns against civilians because of 
their ethnic identity, leading to more shedding of blood. 
Nuer fighters, led by Machar massacred Dinka civilians 
in Garang’s home area in Greater Bor in Jonglei. In 
retaliation, Dinka fighters attacked Nuer areas and also 
massacred civilians. Thus, political antagonisms took on 
an ethnic form. Without doubt, the leaders of the factions 
reached for and played the ‘ethnic card’ in pursuit of their 
leadership ambitions (Jok and Hutchinson 1999).
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The ethnicity-based violence continued in the 1990s, 
and the southern struggle against Khartoum took a 
backseat. The Khartoum regime exploited the bloody 
factionalism in an attempt to end the rebellion. President 
el Bashir, who had came to power in 1989 through a coup, 
rebranded his war against southern rebels as a holy war 
or jihad against infidels. Religion was therefore used to 
mobilise Muslims to participate in the war in essentially 
the same manner that ethnicity was being mobilised in 
the south (Schlichte 2008: 85). Together with Hassan el 
Turabi, an Islamist ideologue, he forged ties with extremist 
countries, groups and individuals in North Africa and the 
Middle East, including Osama bin Laden, partly to gather 
resources for the war effort. For example, Iran provided 
military hardware and technical advice to the Sudanese 
regime (Simone 1994).
Garang turned for support to eastern African countries, 
especially to Uganda, whose president, Yoweri Museveni, 
he had known since the days he lived in Tanzania. 
Museveni and other eastern African leaders were scared 
of the Islamic fanaticism of el Bashir, and provided 
crucial military and political backing to the weakened 
SPLM/A. As Young points out, ‘the fact remains that the 
most significant military accomplishments of the SPLA 
were the result of Ethiopian and Eastern Bloc support in 
the early years, and later due to the support provided by 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda’ (Young 2012). In revenge, 
the el Bashir regime supplied arms and other supplies to 
the Lord’s Resistance Army, which abducted children and 
women and committed appalling atrocities in northern 
Uganda and southern Sudan (Dunn 2007). Museveni and 
other eastern Africa leaders later received backing from 
the United States, which was increasingly concerned by 
the hard-line Islamic policies of the Sudanese regime 
and its links with fundamentalist Islamic groups and 
individuals. This external backing, another form of 
legitimation, proved crucial for Garang’s faction’s ability 
to survive and weather threats from opponents within the 
country. 
Meanwhile, Machar and other rebel commanders 
opposed to Garang failed to maintain a cohesive group. 
Their faction splintered into several factions supported 
by the el Bashir regime. In 1997, they entered into peace 
agreements – the Khartoum Peace Agreement and 
Fashoda Agreement – with the el Bashir regime that 
promised, among other things, self-determination for 
the people of southern Sudan. Although some of the 
elements of the Khartoum Peace Agreement and the 
Fashoda Agreement became a model for the CPA, the 
agreements were neither backed by regional powers 
nor implemented fully by the el Bashir government, and 
ended as yet more dishonoured deals. Consequently, 
the factions that signed up to these agreements lost 
legitimacy among southern Sudanese. Their leaders, 
especially Machar and Akol, were easily painted by their 
detractors as sell-outs who could not deliver on their 
promises. 
Nonetheless, Garang seemingly learned hard lessons 
from these struggles and subsequently modified his 
adamant rejection of the independence of South Sudan, 
and also had to ‘temper his ideological convictions’ 
and revolutionary zeal (Young 2012). According to Lual 
Deng, the SPLM/A, on the verge of defeat, had to consult 
the people in the parts of Sudan under its control on 
the overarching goal of the liberation struggle (Deng 
2013: 135). In April and May 1994, Garang’s SPLM/A 
faction held its first National Convention in Chukudum, 
drawing participants from a wide range of constituencies, 
including chiefs, women, church leaders and youths. 
The ‘New Sudan,’ comprising liberated areas in 
Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and the Southern 
Blue Nile, was subsequently proclaimed, and ‘self-
determination’ was pronounced as an objective of the 
struggle. According to Mansour Khalid (2010), a former 
aide to Garang, the reference to self-determination was 
a response to the breakaway commanders’ call for the 
same. By endorsing the idea, Garang connected with 
what mattered most to much of the southern Sudanese 
populace, and hence it won over the support of many 
separatists in the south, increasing the support base and 
legitimacy of his leadership and his faction. 
The Chukudum Convention established institutions of 
governance such as the National Liberation Council (NLC) 
and an executive body called the National Executive 
Council (NEC). Lual Deng described the Convention as 
proffering a social contract that required the SPLM to 
deliver on its promises (Deng 2013). After a conference 
in 1996, the Civil Authority of the New Sudan (CANS), or 
civil service, was formed and administrative structures 
and entities – including county, payam and boma – were 
introduced throughout the areas under its control (Dak 
1996; Leonardi, Mijak and Hot 2005; Deng 2010a).  
Pieces of legislation were passed in the following years, 
including the Penal Code 2003. Hence, the SPLM/A was 
forming a kind of a state in the areas it controlled without 
claiming international recognition for it as an independent 
state. Meanwhile, international engagement, especially 
through the OLS, as pointed out earlier, facilitated these 
SPLM ‘state’-building activities. 
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Views on Garang’s change of heart about self-
determination and building of institutions varied. Some 
observers thought that the administrative structures were 
intended to more efficiently capture labour and resources 
for the civil war (Bure 2005). Indeed, one key function 
of the administration, including the chiefs, was to raise 
revenues, collect food and to mobilise recruits for the 
SPLA (Bradbury et al. 2006; Leonardi 2007). Although 
CANS and the SPLM were portrayed as structures 
separate from the SPLA, in reality these institutions were 
dominated by the SPLA (Duffield et al. 2000; Rolandsen 
2005). Rolandsen argues that the introduction of these 
institutions was ‘pro forma’ and that the SPLM leadership 
was not actually willing ‘to transfer authority to the newly 
established institutions’ (Rolandsen 2005: 14). Moreover, 
the institutions lacked human and financial resources 
and were only operational to a limited extent (Local 
Government Board 2006). Another critical voice, Peter 
Nyaba, noted that, ‘the promised changes remained 
superficial, unable to penetrate the ossified military core 
where absolute power was concentrated in the hands 
of one person as it was before the 1991 crisis’ (Nyaba 
1997). 
Other observers assumed that Garang simply wanted 
to address internal criticism in the SPLM/A. Notably, he 
not only introduced institutions but also set free some of 
those jailed for opposing him. Thus, he aimed at capturing 
state-like legitimacy for the SPLM/A in the eyes of the 
communities living in the areas under the control of the 
movement. Others believed that he aimed mainly at 
increasing external legitimacy and support. Nyaba (1997), 
for example, insisted that reforms within the SPLM/A were 
driven by external actors: ‘Those semblance of reforms, 
democratization or liberalization in the Movement were a 
half-hearted response to the pressure of the international 
community and a means of relating to it.’
International aid and engagement with the SPLM/A, as 
already pointed out, indeed mirrored external recognition 
of the SPLM/A as a ‘quasi-legitimate political institution’ 
(Duffield et al. 200: 179). A senior SPLM/A member shed 
light on this (ibid):
We acknowledge the positive role of OLS in our struggle, 
but not because it provides food. It is primarily because 
it helps us to run a state. Our people now feel that they 
belong to a government, and that is all because of aid. 
They think that the SPLM government is responsible for 
the coming of aid, and in a way we are responsible for 
it. If it continues and we manage it well, we can actually 
continue our struggle until the day of victory. So when 
aid agencies wonder whether or not this humanitarian 
assistance is fueling the war, they must know that it does 
to a certain degree.
This quote also illustrates that international aid enhanced 
people’s recognition of the SPLM/A because they 
attributed aid and services provided by international 
actors with the SPLM/A. SLRC research shows that 
southern Sudanese continue to attribute credit for 
aid and services provided by international actors to 
state institutions and assume that the latter invite and 
coordinate aid (Maxwell et al. 2015). As Garang rebuilt 
his weakened position in southern Sudan, Machar and 
Akol soon realised that el Bashir was not serious about 
implementation of the agreements he had signed, and so 
left Khartoum and rejoined the SPLM/A. This appeared to 
dash any hope of a final victory for the government army, 
and many southern Sudanese threw their support behind 
the struggle. Serious peace talks, under the mediation 
of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), got underway, with attention focused on self-
determination becoming a right for southerners. Jok 
Madut Jok (2011) points out that:
The entire southern population had hung their aspirations 
for a better future on this right: Most southerners wanted 
it at any cost, and eventually, it became the single issue 
on which every southerner was unwilling to compromise. 
Any political leader who had different opinions about it 
could only voice them to his or her own detriment.
Sudan’s exportation of oil for the first time in 1999 also 
helped the peace process as el Bashir was worried about 
the negative effect of more violence on the booming oil 
industry, while the movement was scared of the prospect 
of more revenues for Khartoum’s war machine. As Lual 
Deng argued, oil ‘contributed to the acceleration of the 
breakup of Sudan into two countries’ (Deng 2013a).
Moreover, the negotiations received a boost with the 
committed backing of the US following the 9/11 attacks 
masterminded by Osama bin Laden, who was once the 
guest of el Bashir. In 1997, President Clinton had imposed 
comprehensive trade and economic sanctions on the el 
Bashir regime, and in November 1999, he had authorised 
‘the US to supply food directly to the SPLA’ (Young 2012). 
Moreover, the US was providing some support to Uganda 
and other countries in the eastern African region to 
counter el Bashir’s regime. Aware of the heightened 
threat to his regime in the wake of 9/11, el Bashir was 
keen to play a positive role in the negotiations, apparently 
to mollify US anger. 
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In July 2002, the parties reached the groundbreaking 
Machakos Protocol, signed by Garang’s deputy, Salva Kiir, 
on behalf of the SPLM/A, which called for the holding of 
a referendum in southern Sudan after a six-year interim 
period so that southerners could choose whether to 
remain part of Sudan or found a new state. The US 
sustained the pressure on the el Bashir regime in October 
by adopting the Sudan Peace Act, which threatened more 
sanctions if it was found that the Sudanese government 
was not acting in good faith. 
The negotiations remained on track and international 
engagement in areas under the SPLM increased. 
International engagement aimed partly at bolstering the 
emerging governance structures in the New Sudan or 
areas under SPLM/A. For example, the United Nations 
Development Programme helped in the process of 
drafting a Local Government Framework, which in due 
course was to become the basis of the Local Government 
Act after the CPA (Harragin 2007). Also, Pact Sudan, 
USAID, the Food and Agriculture Organization and UN 
Population Fund started engaging the SPLM in land 
policy discussions in 2004 (Paul 2008). Moreover, 
the British Council supported the process of creating 
legal frameworks. Thus international actors supported 
institution building in southern Sudan before the signing 
of the CPA. 
With the peace talks progressing rapidly, tensions 
heightened within the SPLM/A. In 2004, a dispute 
erupted between Garang and Kiir, who after signing 
of the Machakos Protocol was replaced in the peace 
negotiations by Nhial Deng Nhial. The leaders of the 
Movement gathered in Rumbek for reconciliation. The 
gathering proved to be challenging for Garang, who was 
accused of some of the same weaknesses that the 
leaders of the 1991 revolt had levelled against him. In 
particular, Kiir was very critical, accusing him of not 
leaving anybody to act when he was away.6 Moreover, 
he was blamed for practising nepotism and not doing 
anything about rampant corruption in the SPLM/A. The 
meeting resolved to deal with these grievances, but this 
did not happen. Instead, Kiir was subsequently retired 
from the SPLA. There is little doubt that the real reason 
for his dismissal from the army was his role in challenging 
Garang (Young 2005). Being removed from the army 
effectively removed Kiir from the structures of power 
at that time, despite his continuing to serve as Deputy 
Chairman of the SPLM. 
6 The minutes of historical SPLM meeting in Rumbek 2004 are available online: www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26320. (Accessed 14 December 2015).
In January 2005, the CPA was signed, addressing most of 
the grievances of the southern Sudanese and included a 
right of self-determination. Garang seemed to have finally 
embraced separatism. On 15 May 2005, he reportedly 
told southern Sudanese in Rumbek that:
I and those who joined me in the bush and fought for 
more than twenty years have brought to you the CPA on 
a golden plate. Our mission is accomplished. It is now 
your turn, especially those who did not have a chance 
to experience bush life. When the time comes to vote at 
referendum, it is your golden chance to determine your 
fate. Would you like to vote to be second-class citizens 
in your own country? It is absolutely your choice. (Deng 
2013)
Pursuant to the CPA implementation, a Government of 
National Unity, Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) 
and other governance institutions were established. On 
8 June 2005, Garang was given a rapturous welcome 
in Khartoum and subsequently became the First Vice 
President of the country and President of the GoSS. The 
kind of welcome he received illustrated the huge backing 
he commanded across the country at that moment. Three 
weeks later, however, he died in a helicopter accident 
while en route to his base in southern Sudan after a visit 
with President Museveni. Kiir assumed the reins of power 
as Chairman and Commander-in -Chief of the SPLM/A, 
First Vice President of the Government of National Unity 
in Khartoum and President of the Government of South 
Sudan.
3.3 Summary of sources of legitimacy during 
the Second War
To summarise the above discussion, John Garang had 
assumed that his struggle against the exploitative and 
repressive regimes based in Khartoum would be popular 
with the majority of southern Sudanese. Even though 
southern Sudanese belong to different ethnic groups, 
they generally agreed to oppose northern Sudanese 
governments whom they accused of misruling the country. 
Garang relied greatly on the support of the Ethiopian 
government and other external backing, and external 
legitimacy was key to the SPLM/A. However, the longer 
he had to contend with the strength of separatism and 
ethnic loyalties in southern Sudan, the more Garang and 
his supporters came to realise that legitimacy in the eyes 
of southern Sudanese could not be taken for granted.
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In the 1980s, with the military help of Ethiopia, he 
defeated southern opponents, loosely organised as 
Anyanya 2, who opposed his united ‘New Sudan’ idea and 
favoured independence. Most of the defeated Anyanya 
2 fighters were Nuer, which deepened ethnic schisms. 
However, in the 1990s separatism re-emerged and ethnic 
tensions were further politicised. Three commanders 
attempted to oust Garang and rejected his ‘New Sudan’ 
idea, triggering ethnically based violence. Most of the 
victims of the violence were Dinka or Nuer.
John Garang survived the attempt to oust him but 
modified his opposition to separatism and also made 
an effort to build institutions as a way of bolstering 
legitimacy. In 1994, a convention was organised for the 
first time to consult on the goals of the rebellion, and 
the SPLM subsequently established some governance 
institutions. Importantly, the convention endorsed self-
determination, which became the cornerstone of the 
future political settlement with the regime in Khartoum. 
The in-fighting in southern Sudan gave Khartoum the 
upper hand on the battlefield, at least for some years. 
Some of Garang’s opponents made peace with Khartoum, 
but were disappointed later as the deals they signed 
were not implemented. They subsequently lost legitimacy 
among southern Sudanese and made peace with Garang, 
rejoining the SPLM/A. The war intensified with Garang 
receiving the backing of the eastern African countries 
and some Western powers, including the US, which 
were worried by Khartoum’s ties with Islamic militants, 
particularly Osama bin Laden. Again, international 
legitimacy and backing helped Garang’s rebellion. 
In the 2000s, peace talks backed by the US and regional 
countries picked up pace and culminated in the historic 
CPA. When Garang returned to Khartoum in July 2005, 
over a million Sudanese came onto the streets to 
welcome him. His popularity and the legitimacy of the 
movement he founded, which were intertwined, had 
become unquestionable.
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The CPA was based on the notion of ‘one country, two 
systems’ (Deng 2010a). Backed by the US, it was 
informed by the liberal model of peacebuilding, which 
meant ‘the promotion of democracy, market-based 
economic reforms and a range of institutions associated 
with “modern” states as a driving force for building 
“peace”’ (Newman et al. 2009: 2). The post-war south was 
supposed to develop along democratic, decentralised, 
market-oriented, and rule-based principles, quite 
different from those pursued by el Bashir and other 
leaders of what Garang called ‘Old Sudan’. It was 
supposed to develop institutions with the capacity to 
deliver basic services to citizens so as to fulfil its social 
contract and enhance the legitimacy of the government of 
southern Sudan, particularly after it became the state of 
South Sudan in 2011. 
The signatories to the CPA had committed themselves to 
work during the six-year interim period to make continued 
unity of the former Sudan attractive for the war-weary 
and largely separatist southern Sudanese. Southern 
Sudanese were supposed to receive peace dividends 
in the form of access to education, health, water and 
sanitation, and other basic services so as to benefit from 
the ‘peace’, which would, in theory, motivate them to 
vote for unity during the referendum. The US and other 
donors pledged billions of dollars for peacebuilding, ‘also 
known as post-conflict reconstruction and nation building’ 
(Higashi 2015: 1). The former Sudan itself had lots of 
petrodollars and was supposed to actively engage in 
provision of basic services so as to make unity attractive. 
What emerged in the two parts of the former Sudan 
diverged substantially from the basic tenets of liberal 
peacebuilding, however. The ‘peace dividends’ did not 
materialise. Many southern Sudanese did not see the 
promised peace, security and basic services, partly 
because the fighting did not end throughout the country. 
In Jonglei, for example, inter and intra-communal 
violence remained a major problem despite peace 
agreements (Thomas 2015: 292). SLRC respondents 
from Jonglei recognised that the state was young and 
lacked capacity but they expected it to at least provide 
security from violence (Maxwell et al. 2014). The violence 
in this part of southern Sudan continued to worsen 
after the declaration of independence in 2011, with the 
number of conflict-affected people who were internally 
displaced reaching 188,526 by November 2013 (All Party 
Parliamentary Group for Sudan and South Sudan 2015).
A study carried out by Jok Madut Jok for the United 
4 Statebuilding 
and legitimacy after 
the CPA 
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States Institute of Peace (USIP: 3) in 2011 observes the 
centrality of insecurity to people’s perceptions of ‘peace 
dividends’:
Undoubtedly, the security of individual and property is a 
major concern for people: Many who were interviewed 
for this report spoke of it [security] as the single most 
important expected peace dividend and have been most 
disappointed by its failure to materialize.
The results of the research carried out by SLRC not only 
confirmed the persistence of violence and the deepening 
disappointment on the part of ordinary people, but also 
revealed that some aspects of service delivery in the 
peripheral areas of South(ern) Sudan, such as livelihood 
services, were actually much better during the OLS 
time compared to the period after the CPA (Maxwell et 
al. 2014). Infrastructure and services improved after 
2005 but remained limited, particularly in peripheral 
areas such as Jonglei (Maxwell et al. 2014; Santschi 
et al. 2014). Hence, neglect of peripheral parts of 
South(ern) Sudan did not end and, in fact, grew worse 
in some areas. Yet, despite the inadequate service 
provision, the respondents still had a positive attitude 
to the government – a government which was still seen 
by many as legitimate because of independence from 
Sudan. Respondents explained the limited capacity and 
the resources of the government in terms of the newness 
of the country.
Ironically, the way donors and other international actors 
operated, as well as the policies of the new authorities in 
South(ern) Sudan, led to a sharpening of the development 
divide between the rural and urban areas. This was in 
distinct contrast to the war-time SPLM/A’s ‘New Sudan’ 
idea, particularly the notion of ‘taking towns to the 
people’ (Deng 2013a). Development was supposed to be 
provided throughout the country in an equitable manner 
for practical reasons as well: so that citizens would not 
flock into urban areas to access basic services. Yet, due 
partly to lack of roads and mobility, the dearth of service 
delivery to rural areas left rural people almost entirely 
without access or support. 
Moreover, international actors did not prioritise conflict 
resolution and reconciliation after the CPA, which very 
disproportionately impacted people in rural areas due to 
insecurity. Instead it mainly pursued a technical approach 
to statebuilding (All Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan 
and South Sudan 2015). Donors and other international 
actors assumed ‘that greater development – improved 
services, infrastructure, access to food – would lead to 
stability and lasting peace’ (Pantuliano 2014). Indeed, a 
multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention 
and peacebuilding 2005-2010, found no evidence of the 
assumed causal link between provision of basic services 
or peace dividends and lessening of violent conflict 
(Bennet et al. 2010). 
Another reason for the continued neglect of some areas 
was the apparent lack of political will for prioritising 
basic service delivery. Top leaders were focused 
on achieving southern secession and building their 
power bases through patronage, and did not prioritise 
providing services to their people. Meanwhile, el Bashir 
and his allies had seemingly lost hope of making unity 
attractive, and were working to entrench themselves in 
power after the south had gone. Hence, leaders on both 
sides shared an interest in consolidating power and 
positioning themselves as the leaders of the soon-to-be-
born new countries. It was therefore not surprising that 
when separation finally happened ‘two countries, one 
system’ was the outcome (Chun 2013). The expected 
transformation of Southern Sudan on the basis of a 
liberal peacebuilding model did not happen, partly 
because it did not serve the real interests of the leaders 
who ascended to the leadership of the new country, and 
partly because of the questionable assumptions of the 
model itself.
The following discussion examines how southern leaders 
steered their new state toward the same system as that 
of the ‘Old Sudan’. In particular, it focuses on the sources 
of legitimacy that these leaders relied on after the end 
of the war in 2005, up to and including the resumption of 
conflict in late 2013.
4.1 Wobbly ‘big tent’ and power consolidation
In contrast to John Garang, who was ‘extraordinarily 
charismatic, highly intelligent and unusually arrogant’ 
(Lusk, 2005), Kiir was viewed as quiet, deferential, and 
‘glowing with dignified humility,’ in the words of Francis 
Deng (2010b: 484). He inherited a ‘big tent’ governance 
approach – aimed at bringing into government as many 
opponents as possible to build political unity and counter 
insecurity and infighting – and made it even bigger by 
co-opting more militiamen, some of them with a penchant 
for changing sides whenever it suited them (LeRiche and 
Arnold, 2012: 160; Gordon 2014: vi). In January 2006, for 
example, the most prominent of them, General Paulino 
Matip, a Nuer strongman who helped the el Bashir regime 
to secure and control the oilfields in Unity State during the 
war years, joined the SPLA. Following the CPA, Kiir and the 
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SPLM/A genuinely enjoyed legitimacy or public popularity 
because of the liberation struggle (NDI 2005). Indeed, for 
a long time, the SPLM’s major source of legitimacy was 
its ‘claims of ownership in achieving liberation’ (LeRiche 
and Arnold 2012: 213). However, tensions were building 
up among key SPLM leaders. At the time of the second 
SPLM convention in Juba in May 2008, tensions between 
the key figures of the SPLM, including the party chairman, 
his deputies and the secretary general, came to the 
surface. These were quickly contained to avoid derailing 
progress towards independence, but they became more 
pronounced again during the elections of 2010. 
In April 2010, Kiir unsurprisingly won a landslide victory. 
Many southern Sudanese considered him as the 
legitimate leader whom they trusted to lead them to 
independence. However, the elections in general were 
contentious and bred more divisions and rebellions. One 
of the problems was that ‘the party dictated that time 
spent in the movement was the key criteria for selection 
as an SPLM nominee’ (LeRiche and Arnold, 2012: 217). 
Consequently, many individuals felt that they were 
unfairly excluded from the list of SPLM flag-bearers in the 
elections (225). The credibility of the exercise itself was 
also questioned. For example, the Carter Center reported 
widespread irregularities in vote tabulation (Carter Center 
2010). Some losing candidates, included General George 
Athor and David Yau Yau in Jonglei, who were not selected 
to run as SPLM candidates and subsequently lost the 
elections in their constituencies, took up arms. Some of 
them died in the ensuing fight with the SPLA, while others 
were re-absorbed by the regime. The Pibor Peace Accord 
in 2014 was a deal between Yau Yau and the government, 
and created the Greater Pibor Administrative Area. 
In January 2011, southern Sudanese voted peacefully 
in the referendum, leading to the formal declaration 
of independence on 9 July. On Independence Day, 
thousands of South Sudanese celebrated their new 
status as an independent and sovereign country. The 
SPLM/A could and did claim that South Sudan’s 
independence was the culmination of its ‘liberation 
struggle’ against the government of Sudan.
With 50 percent of oil revenues flowing into the coffers of 
the government in Juba (while the rest went to Khartoum) 
and the goodwill of the international community in hand, 
Kiir and other leaders of the SPLM had the resources to 
implement the economic and social agenda that the party 
had championed since the beginning of the war. However, 
they were seemingly more interested in the stability of 
the increasingly wobbly ‘big tent’ than pursuing such 
transformation. The approach of integrating former rebel 
groups into the SPLM and the SPLA (and paying them) 
was incredibly expensive to maintain. 
Instead of fuelling development, billions of petrodollars 
– 98 percent of South Sudan’s GDP – were lost through 
corruption. As early as the period 2005/06, an audit 
report presented by the Auditor General to the National 
Assembly (NA) revealed rampant misappropriation of 
state resources. Like other institutions of governance, the 
NA could not do much to address this problem. With the 
Anti-Corruption Commission and the judiciary unable or 
unwilling to fight corruption, funds continued to go into 
private pockets. No wonder, then, that South Sudan was 
ranked number 171 out 175 countries on the corruption 
perceptions index released by Transparency International 
in 2014. Even the president reportedly wrote letters to 
75 former and current politicians and senior officials to 
return billions of dollars that were illicitly appropriated 
(Smith 2012). The state was therefore unable to provide 
adequate basic services and security to its population. 
Respondents from Northern Jonglei and Pibor were 
particularly concerned about insecurity and what they 
perceived as an unfair distribution of resources at the 
central and the state level. Furthermore, the lowest 
levels of government, where security is actually delivered, 
hardly received any resources. State resources were 
mainly concentrated at the central level, with some 
reaching the state level but very little getting to the local 
level. The paltry state resources trickling down to the 
local level in Northern Jonglei were mainly used to pay 
the salaries of state employees (Maxwell et al. 2014). In 
terms of resource allocation, a large proportion went to 
security and only limited resources to service delivery. 
In 2012/13, for instance, 7 percent of the budget was 
spent on education, 7 percent on health, 9 percent on 
infrastructure, while 13 percent went to ‘the rule of law’ 
and 28 percent to security (Attipoe et al. 2014). 
Ethnicity has continued to be used for political and 
military mobilisation to enhance individual leadership 
ambitions. As a result, violence has often been ethnically 
based. There has been no conscious effort to de-
legitimatise mobilisation along ethnic lines or to foster 
nationbuilding, notwithstanding the political rhetoric of 
the oneness of the South Sudanese. Jok Madut Jok notes 
that interviewees for the report he prepared for USIP 
in 2011 pointed out that southern Sudanese thought 
‘the government and its development partners heavily 
focused on statebuilding and less so on nationbuilding’ 
(Jok 2011: 4). The institutions that emerged did not do 
what they were expected to, in part because the power 
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of ethnicity (and the patronage networks overlaying it) 
undermined their effectiveness. According to the Anti-
Corruption Survey 2007, nepotism and favouritism, 
particularly with reference to employment, were among 
the most common forms of corruption (SSACC 2007). 
These problems, which were rampant during the war 
years and in the post-war period, were then compounded 
by challenges posed by the Transitional Constitution of 
South Sudan, which was adopted upon independence. 
This constitution was regarded by many a regression from 
the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan because it 
boosted the powers of the executive (Deng 2013b). This 
negatively affected the balance of power at different 
levels of government. 
4.2 Return to factionalism and war
After independence and the formal end of exploitation 
and repression by Khartoum, the rudimentary southern 
nationalism which had evolved in the context of 
opposition to the north quickly unravelled. Kiir’s ‘big 
tent’ began to rupture very quickly, with his colleagues 
questioning his ability to run the country. Many within the 
SPLM complained that ‘the party had lost direction since 
the independence referendum and had no real vision 
or programme for national development and national 
unity’ (Johnson 2014: 6). In fact, the feeling that the 
SPLM had lost direction had begun to take hold before 
the referendum vote, but this was largely contained, such 
as in October 2010,  when southern Sudanese political 
leaders met in Juba to bury their differences so as to 
deliver a successful referendum (Sudan Tribune 2010). 
Differences resurfaced after the referendum and the 
political situation deteriorated. Indeed, studies conducted 
by polling organisations, in particular the US-based 
National Democratic Institute of International Affairs 
and International Republican Institute, showed that the 
majority of South Sudanese felt that their country was not 
heading in the right direction (Traci and Moro 2012).
President Kiir, however, used his extensive powers to 
contain the rising opposition and challenges from senior 
colleagues in the SPLM. SPLM Secretary-General Pagan 
Amum, Garang’s widow Rebecca Nyandeng, and Vice 
President Riek Machar had openly expressed their desire 
to challenge him for the chairmanship of the party, which 
was the surest way to the presidency. In July 2013, Kiir 
dismissed Machar from the Vice Presidency, along with 
the whole cabinet, and brought in new faces, including 
some from outside the SPLM – a step that many 
southerners expected in view of corruption accusations. 
Yet, some people – especially those who lost their 
positions in the executive – felt that the change was not 
about addressing corruption but about ousting political 
opponents. The unfolding infighting and factionalism 
played out in the SPLM at the same time that founding 
documents were being redrafted. The faction of the 
SPLM opposed to Kiir, led by Machar, pulled out of the 
process when they thought it was being managed so as to 
extend the president’s term of office. The wrangling partly 
followed old divides dating back to the SPLM/A split of 
1991, as discussed elsewhere.
On 15 December 2013, clashes took place among SPLA 
soldiers based in Juba, quickly spreading to Jonglei, Upper 
Nile and Unity states. The following day, Kiir claimed 
that a coup, spearheaded by Machar, had been foiled, 
and arrested Pagan Amum, former Deputy Minister of 
Defence Majaak de’Agot, and other prominent SPLM 
figures. In total, 11 alleged coup plotters were taken from 
their homes. The SPLA had divided again along familiar 
lines, with one faction supporting Kiir and another loyal 
to Machar. In a spate of killings, Nuer civilians were 
targeted by soldiers in Juba and others were protected by 
the UN. Reportedly, while Dinka civilians were targeted 
in predominantly Nuer-inhabited areas in apparent 
retaliation. A list of human rights abuses was presented 
in the report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry 
on South Sudan (African Union Commission of Inquiry on 
South Sudan 2014).
Machar escaped capture in Juba and resurfaced as the 
leader of a new armed rebellion called the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO). 
The White Army, or armed Nuer youth in Jonglei, marched 
on Bor, capturing it and killing many people. They were 
stopped from reaching Juba by the combined efforts 
of SPLA and Ugandan soldiers. Subsequently, millions 
of people were displaced internally or to neighbouring 
countries and remain dependent on international 
assistance. The hopes of peace and stability have been 
dashed, at least for now, as ceasefires and agreements 
have not led to a decisive end to violence, which instead 
spread to hitherto peaceful areas in the Equatoria 
and Bahr el Ghazal regions. Moreover, South Sudan is 
afflicted by a crippling economic crisis caused by the war 
and low oil revenues, plunging many more people into 
food insecurity. 
In the wake of the upheaval, the international community 
largely abandoned supporting development activities 
and has been assisting the victims of the war (Maxwell 
et al. 2016). It has become very critical of the actions of 
the belligerents. Clearly, the hitherto close relationship 
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between the main global players, especially the US, 
and GoSS has broken down. Instead, the international 
community is avoiding the central state apparatus and 
focusing on local government or/and traditional leaders.7 
A South Sudanese official suggested that GoSS is not 
any longer viewed as a legitimate government by some 
international actors.8 According to a religious leader, 
many South Sudanese are also questioning the legitimacy 
of their political leaders.9
SPLM/A leaders often claim that the country is young, 
and in time will get its act together. Some in the SPLM or 
government circles compare it with a small child: ‘This 
is a brand new country – there’s a lot of need, and it’s 
a huge and tremendous challenge. … It’s going to take 
time to get to where we need to be. We are like a small 
child, learning how to crawl,’ said an SPLM member in the 
diaspora, Jacob Mach (Basu and Karimi 2012). In May 
2014, Benjamin Marial, the former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation, told the audience 
at an Oslo donor conference (Voice of America 2014):
This is a young country... two years old... breaking a few 
glasses? I’m sure some of you here are married and 
7 Interview with the head of INGO in Juba on 11 June 2014.
8  Interview with official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Juba on 10 June 2014.
9 Interview with a South Sudanese religious leader in Juba on 18 March 2016.
10 Interview with a South Sudanese religious leader in Juba on 18 March 2016.
have children, and especially the last born. When it runs 
around, knocking glasses around – you don’t throw that 
wonderful last born through the window into the snow or 
into the sunshine. Equally, the mother will say, ‘Next time, 
you won’t break the glasses’. (Voice of America 2014)
While it is true that the South Sudanese state was 
born only a few years ago, after years of violence 
and destruction, the institutions of the country were 
not established from scratch in 2005 or in 2011. As 
mentioned above, the SPLM formed institutions from 
the time of the 1994 Chukudum Convention, and the 
international community supported their development. 
The leaders of South Sudan have not had the political will 
nor the means to develop fully functioning and effective 
institutions that can address major challenges and also 
check the monopolisation of power by certain individuals 
and branches of government. The narrative of ‘youngness’ 
is a mask for something else, including the unwillingness 
of leaders to embrace change, which would take more 
than resources to correct. A religious leader lamented 
that: ‘this child is crazy as it does not grow and is always 
on emergency.’10 
School in Tomping, Juba. Credit: United Nation Photo
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In essence, the SPLM leaders relied on the liberation 
‘capital’ or legacy to legitimise their actions and to ask for 
patience in the face of accusations of failing to deliver 
on their promises following the CPA and independence. 
Moreover, they have repeatedly reminded their own 
people and the international community that the country 
is young, using this narrative to cover a lack of political will 
to build effective institutions. Although it would not have 
solved all the country’s woes, political will would probably 
have gone a long way in addressing critical challenges, 
particularly corruption.
After independence, the SPLM descended into 
acrimonious internal squabbles which pushed the 
country into another round of armed fighting that followed 
old divides that date back to the past second civil war. 
Subsequently, development was abandoned and the 
focus shifted to humanitarianism. For many people, the 
liberation legacy has been fading in view of the spreading 
violence, deepening humanitarian woes and worsening 
economic challenges. It seems that the state’s legitimacy 
is increasingly impacted by the its failure to provide 
security, which is the basic expectation of people. 
 The report examines the different sources of legitimacy 
in the newly born South Sudan. It argues that basic 
service delivery is important and shapes citizens’ views 
of the state and their leaders, yet it is far from the only 
source of legitimacy, nor is its relationship with state 
legitimacy straightforward. The report also contends 
that the donor notion of basic service delivery enhancing 
state legitimacy is largely ahistorical and apolitical in 
this context. In South Sudan, legitimacy is not only about 
basic service delivery but also about history of years 
of struggle against marginalisation, exploitation and 
repression by Khartoum-based regimes, engagement 
with regional and international actors, and ethnicity. 
Above all it is about politics.
Past practices, experiences, and views of the state 
from the colonial, post-colonial to the more recent civil 
war period (1983-2005) shape present-day statehood 
and legitimacy in South Sudan. The long history of 
marginalisation of southerners by regimes in the former 
Sudan, or what John Garang called ‘Old Sudan’, had 
a significant influence on legitimacy of the SPLM/A 
during and after the second war. SPLM/A leaders used 
the slogan of ‘New Sudan’ during the war to mobilise 
opposition to Khartoum. One of the key tenets of the ‘New 
Sudan’ was equitable service delivery, which regimes in 
the former Sudan failed to do. In fact, with the support 
of international actors, the SPLM/A did provide some 
5 Conclusion
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limited services during the war, and it promised to do 
more once the struggle was won. This promise has 
never been satisfactorily met since the SPLM/A came 
to power in Southern Sudan, or in South Sudan from 
July 2011, because of corruption and other factors. This 
brought disappointment, although many also accepted 
the notion that it was a young state with limited capacity. 
But many people, especially in conflict-affected Jonglei, 
nevertheless expected security to be guaranteed.
Southern Sudanese, however, did not lose faith in their 
leaders or the political system, mainly because the 
SPLM/A was credited with bringing about independence, 
which served as a major source of legitimacy. Considering 
the fact that generations of southern Sudanese fought for 
this goal, it was not surprising that many South Sudanese 
still appreciated and backed the SPLM/A and its leaders 
despite its failure to provide substantial services and 
security.
Since the second civil war period, the backing of external 
players has been crucial for the SPLM/A, its leaders, 
11 Radio Tamazuj (2015) White House questions legitimacy of the South Sudan government. www.radiotamazuj.org/en/article/white-house-questions-legitimacy-
south-sudan-govt. (Accessed 20 March 2016).
and the institutions that it created. During the war, the 
SPLM/A received recognition and support from regional 
powers. The aid from outside proffered some external 
legitimacy to the rebellion, which proved beneficial to its 
confrontation with Khartoum-based regimes. However, 
the support was neither consistent nor continuous. For 
example, since the outbreak of violence in December 
2013, external support has diminished as the 
relationship between donors and South Sudan’s leaders 
has turned sour. The US government, among others, has 
openly questioned the legitimacy of the South Sudanese 
government.11 
Another source of legitimacy was ethnicity, on the basis 
of which leaders mobilised military and political support. 
This was a particularly useful resource during competition 
for political office, particularly during elections and also 
during conflict. Ethnicity has been very important, as 
the sense of nationhood is fragile. The downside is that 
ethnicity is behind violence in the country as leaders 
often mobilise their groups along ethnic lines against 
others, as is evident in the ongoing armed conflict. 
Women carrying water in South Sudan. Credit: Alun McDonald/Oxfam
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